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Note 
 
Juveniles Locked in Limbo: Why Pretrial 
Detention Implicates a Fundamental Right 
Shana Conklin 
A fifteen-year-old boy named James allegedly stole a bus 
pass, and the police detained him for the offense.1 Despite the 
fact that James and his mother attended all his scheduled court 
dates, the juvenile court denied his request to be released be-
fore his trial.2 For the trivial act of stealing a bus pass, the 
court decided to detain him and set his bail at $1500.3 James’s 
family could not afford his bail.4  
At the age of fifteen, a girl named Maria spent eight weeks 
in a juvenile detention center before trial.5 What was her of-
fense? Allegedly, she brought a small metal nail file to school.6  
The police found a boy named Kenny with a group of kids 
peering into a vandalized car on the street.7 Prosecutors 
charged him with receiving stolen property and requested his 
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 1. ROBIN L. DAHLBERG, LOCKING UP OUR CHILDREN: THE SECURE DE-
TENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS YOUTH AFTER ARRAIGNMENT AND BEFORE AD-
JUDICATION 21 (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/racialjustice/ 
locking_up_our_children_web_ma.pdf.  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 24. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 22. 
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bail be set at $150.8 Unfortunately for Kenny, the court set bail 
at $300, twice the amount requested. Unable to pay, Kenny 
waited an agonizing five days before trial.9  
These cases are not anomalies.10 On any given day, a star-
tling 27,000 juveniles are incarcerated while waiting for their 
court dates.11 Pretrial detentions for juveniles have risen since 
the 1970s,12 with an astounding seventy-two percent increase 
since the 1990s.13 Most of these juveniles either committed 
nonviolent, minor offenses or will eventually be acquitted of the 
charges.14 Nevertheless, they are kept isolated from their fami-
lies, friends, and schools until the adjudication of their guilt.15 
Juveniles do not have a meaningful opportunity to contest 
pretrial detention.16 Juvenile courts have limited procedural 
and substantive safeguards in place for juveniles at the pretrial 
detention stage.17 Statutes authorizing judges to detain juve-
niles usually do not provide satisfactory criteria for judges to 
use when making the decision to detain a juvenile.18 Often, 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Carol Rose & Amy Reichbach, Locking Up Our Children, BAY ST. 
BANNER, May 15, 2008, available at http://www.baystatebanner.com/Opinion58 
-2008-05-15. 
 11. COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, UNLOCKING THE FUTURE: DETENTION 
REFORM IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2003), available at http://www 
.juvjustice.org/media/resources/public/resource_114.pdf. 
 12. Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventative Detention and the 
Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 415 (1996). 
 13. COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 11. 
 14. Id. (explaining that in 1999, nearly seventy percent of juveniles in pre-
trial detention had allegedly committed nonviolent offenses). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 285–86 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that in order to make a pretrial detention decision, “each judge 
must rely on his own subjective judgment, based on the limited information 
available to him at court intake and whatever personal standards he himself 
has developed in exercising his discretionary authority under the statute” 
(quoting United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 702 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981))). 
 17. Charles E. Frazier & Donna M. Bishop, The Pretrial Detention of Ju-
veniles and Its Impact on Case Dispositions, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1132, 1132 (1985) (“Unlike the adjudicatory stage of delinquency case pro-
cessing, the detention stage traditionally has been unrestrained by either 
strict substantive or procedural legal safeguards.”). 
 18. Id. at 1135; id. at 1151 (“[D]uring the course of this research, juvenile 
justice personnel suggested to us that detention criteria are so broad that vir-
tually every child charged with a delinquent act could be said to meet these 
criteria.”). 
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statutes allow judges to detain juveniles if they believe the ju-
venile is likely to commit a crime again.19 The inability of juve-
niles to contest these detentions and the lack of objective crite-
ria in statutes foster arbitrary decisions.20  
At the birth of the juvenile court, reformers attempted to 
develop a system that melded child welfare concerns with crime 
control.21 Despite the founders’ original intentions, however, 
the juvenile court system has moved away from the therapeutic 
model to a punitive model. The increasingly punitive nature of 
the system warrants a second look at the due process safe-
guards courts afford—or do not afford—juveniles. In In re L.M., 
the Kansas Supreme Court decided, based on the increasingly 
punitive nature of the juvenile justice system, that juveniles 
should have a constitutional right to a jury trial.22 This decision 
analogously provides support for the argument that juveniles 
deserve more due process safeguards at the point of pretrial de-
tention. Other jurisdictions have not yet followed this  
approach. 
This Note argues that courts should recognize that the 
ability to contest pretrial detention is a fundamental right, pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Part I of 
this Note discusses the evolution of the juvenile court and the 
due process safeguards it affords juveniles. It outlines the sem-
inal cases regarding a juvenile’s right to contest pretrial deten-
tion. Part II of this Note critiques the reasoning behind the 
placement of so many juveniles in pretrial detention and exam-
ines statutes that permit judges to detain juveniles. Finally, 
Part III advocates that in light of the increasingly punitive na-
ture of the system, all juveniles should be given greater proce-
dural safeguards including the right to contest pretrial deten-
tion. Enacting statutes with specific criteria would give 
juveniles a meaningful opportunity to contest pretrial detention. 
I.  TREAT CHILDREN LIKE CHILDREN: THE BEGINNINGS 
OF THE JUVENILE COURT   
Prior to the nineteenth century, England and the United 
States lumped children older than seven years into the same 
 
 19. Id. at 1135.  
 20. See id. at 1132. 
 21. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 4 (2004). 
 22. 186 P.3d 164, 170–72 (Kan. 2008). 
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system as adult offenders.23 Juveniles faced the same punish-
ments as adults, including death by hanging and incarcera-
tion.24 In the early nineteenth century, Progressive reformers 
sought to change the way the justice system treated juveniles.25 
Progressives believed that the justice system should treat chil-
dren differently in light of their vulnerability, innocence, and 
dependent nature.26 In particular, the reformers focused on the 
idea that children experienced different development stages, 
including childhood and adolescence.27 In light of this progres-
sive view of child development, reformers advocated the for-
mation of a juvenile court.28 They wanted the justice system to 
recognize that children have a lower level of culpability than 
adults.29 
Lucy Flowers, “the mother of the juvenile court,”30 devel-
oped a system that recognized the principle “that a child should 
be treated as a child.”31 The juvenile court relied on the princi-
ple of parens patriae.32 This concept supported the notion that 
a state should act like a parent when it intervenes in a troubled 
youth’s life.33 Whereas the juvenile justice system doled out re-
habilitative sentences as punishment, the adult system focused 
on punitive measures.34 The juvenile court endeavored to de-
 
 23. Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine that Arrived at the Wrong Station: 
How to Get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 
403 (1999); Julie J. Kim, Note, Left Behind: The Paternalistic Treatment of 
Status Offenders Within the Juvenile Justice System, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 843, 
847 (2010). 
 24. Zierdt, supra note 23. 
 25. BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMIN-
ISTRATION 2 (3d ed. 2009) (“During the early nineteenth century, the social 
construction of adolescence as a developmental stage distinct from adulthood 
and new sensibilities about children began to pose problems for the criminal 
justice system.”). 
 26. Id. at 3. 
 27. Id. at 2–3. 
 28. See id. at 3–4. 
 29. Id. 
 30. TANENHAUS, supra note 21 (explaining that social settlement leader 
Graham Taylor referred to Lucy Flowers as “the mother of the juvenile court” 
because she called for the creation of a juvenile court in 1888). 
 31. Id. at 23. 
 32. Id. at 58, 104. 
 33. FELD, supra note 25, at 4. See generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE 
CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY xxix (2d ed. 1977) (providing 
useful background information on the Progressive era, including the notion 
that “[p]aternalism was a typical ingredient of most reforms in the Progres-
sive era”). 
 34. FELD, supra note 25, at 4.  
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cide which course of action would be in the best interests of the 
offender.35 The rest of Part I discusses the juvenile justice sys-
tem’s departure from its original rehabilitative principles. 
A. DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS FOR JUVENILES 
When the juvenile court was established, Progressive re-
formers did not envision the need for due process safeguards.36 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pur-
ports that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liber-
ty, or property, without due process of law.”37 The reformers 
thought that the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court 
made the safeguards unnecessary.38 Juvenile courts exercised 
discretion over cases in an informal manner.39 Juveniles could 
not request a jury or contact a lawyer for assistance.40 In es-
sence, the reformers hoped to distinguish juvenile courts from 
the adult criminal courts.41 Therefore, the reformers wished to 
equip judges with enough discretion to determine what would 
be in the best interests of the young offenders.42 The proceed-
ings were not supposed to mirror the adversarial nature of the 
criminal courts; instead, the reformers intended to fashion a 
system that was civil in nature.43 Some reasoned that juvenile 
proceedings should be considered civil rather than criminal in 
nature because unlike adults, juveniles had no rights.44 The 
proceedings would simply determine the custody of a child, 
which meant that these proceedings would not be subject to the 
 
 35. Sacha M. Coupet, Comment, What to Do with the Sheep in Wolf ’s 
Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Con-
structive Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 
1308 (2000). 
 36. TANENHAUS, supra note 21, at 25, 104; Kim, supra note 23.  
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 38. Kim, supra note 23. 
 39. FELD, supra note 25, at 4. 
 40. Id. (explaining that the courts rejected the need for procedural safe-
guards prevalent in adult criminal court because the juvenile justice system 
focused on rehabilitation, not punishment). 
 41. See id. (arguing that removing children from the adult criminal court 
system would help courts “diagnose the causes of and prescribe the cures for 
delinquency”). 
 42. See id. 
 43. Kim, supra note 23; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 74–77 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that juvenile 
proceedings are supposed to be civil, not criminal, in nature). But see Breed v. 
Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975) (arguing that the Court should “eschew ‘the 
‘civil’ label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings’”). 
 44. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. 
 2012] JUVENILES LOCKED IN LIMBO 2155 
 
same requirements as adult proceedings, when a state restricts 
a person’s liberty.45 
In 1966, the Supreme Court began to depart from the re-
formers’ original model for a juvenile court in Kent v. United 
States.46 Prior to trial, the juvenile court detained Kent, a four-
teen-year-old, for a week and subsequently transferred his case 
to adult criminal court without a hearing.47 The Court held that 
the juvenile court could not disregard Kent’s statutorily con-
ferred right to have a hearing before waiver into adult court.48 
The Court expressed concern with the lack of due process safe-
guards in juvenile courts.49 The Court asserted “that there may 
be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both 
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults 
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated 
for children.”50  
Shortly after Kent, the Court granted juveniles several due 
process safeguards in In re Gault.51 A lower court judge sen-
tenced Gault, a fifteen-year-old boy, to incarceration for six 
years for making a prank phone call52 and acting in a habitual-
ly immoral way.53 The Court explained that absent adequate 
legal counsel, juveniles are at a substantial disadvantage in the 
courtroom.54 When a juvenile faces incarceration, he is “sub-
jected to the loss of his liberty for years” which “is comparable 
in seriousness to a felony prosecution.”55 The Court recognized 
that neither the judge nor the probation officer may act as a 
representative for a juvenile delinquent and that the presence 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Kim, supra note 23, at 852. 
 47. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543–49.  
 48. Id. at 557. 
 49. Id.; see also MICHAEL D. GRIMES, PATCHING UP THE CRACKS: A CASE 
STUDY OF JUVENILE COURT REFORM 10 (2005) (“Thus, what seemed to pro-
gressive reformers to be a better way to address the unique needs of children 
in a more informal and individualized way would later be seen as a system 
that denied children their rights to due process.”). 
 50. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.  
 51. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 52. Id. at 29. One author characterized Gault’s sentence as “an extreme 
miscarriage[ ] of justice.” David N. Sandberg, Resolving the Gault Dilemma, 48 
N.H. B.J. 58, 58 (2007). 
 53. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 9. The judge defended his ruling that Gault 
acted in a habitually immoral way by explaining that Gault had stolen a base-
ball mitt at the age of thirteen and subsequently lied to the police about it. 
Sandberg, supra note 52, at 59, 66 n.15. 
 54. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36–37. 
 55. Id. at 36. 
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of an attorney for a child in such a complex system is critical to 
make certain due process is carried out.56 
In re Gault is a seminal case because it secured a number 
of due process safeguards for juveniles for the first time.57 Spe-
cifically, the Court held that juveniles have (1) the right to 
counsel,58 (2) the right to adequate notice of a hearing,59 (3) the 
right to written notice to a parent or guardian,60 and (4) the 
right against self-incrimination.61 When a juvenile faces 
lengthy incarceration, the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment ensures that the individual receives “fair 
treatment.”62 The Court’s recognition of these due process safe-
guards significantly changed the juvenile justice system.63  
The In re Gault decision marked a substantial departure 
from the reformers’ original vision of the juvenile court.64 Some 
worried that granting juveniles due process rights would blur 
the line between the criminal court and juvenile court and 
would detract from juvenile court’s rehabilitative underpin-
nings.65 Whereas Justice Abe Fortas believed the due process 
safeguards would not alter the basic structure of the juvenile 
court, Justice Potter Stewart worried that In re Gault “sounded 
the death knell for the juvenile court.”66 Justice Fortas asserted 
that the juvenile court could retain its unique features if the 
 
 56. See id.  
 57. Sandberg, supra note 52.  
 58. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.  
 59. Id. at 33. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 47 (“It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children.”). 
 62. Id. at 30. Justice Black took a different stance in his concurrence, ar-
guing that if a court denies these rights to a juvenile, it would constitute “in-
vidious discrimination” and violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Id. at 61 (Black, J., concurring). 
 63. Sandberg, supra note 52.  
 64. See Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, a Common Code: Eval-
uating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 102 
(2011); Sandberg, supra note 52. 
 65. Sandberg, supra note 52; see also Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, 
Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile 
Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 560–62 (1998) (noting the 
Court’s hesitancy to grant additional due process safeguards to juveniles rest-
ed in the belief that it would ruin the traditional juvenile court model). 
 66. Neitz, supra note 64, at 103 (“The [Gault] Court acknowledged the 
unique benefits of the juvenile system, but believed that the imposition of due 
process standards would not disrupt such benefits.”); Sandberg, supra note 52. 
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new due process procedures were “intelligently and not ruth-
lessly administered.”67 
A few years later, the Court determined that the Due Pro-
cess Clause entitles juveniles to the application of a beyond a 
reasonable-doubt standard of proof for a criminal conviction.68 
Without the reasonable-doubt standard, the Court stated juve-
niles would be subjected to a “disadvantage amounting to a 
lack of fundamental fairness.”69 In the context of juvenile jus-
tice, the Court held that the relevant inquiry is whether the 
procedural safeguards are “necessary to guarantee the funda-
mental fairness of juvenile proceedings.”70 
After initially recognizing that juveniles have several due 
process rights, the Court became reluctant to extend any more 
due process protections.71 In 1971, the Court in McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania cautioned against providing juveniles with addi-
tional due process safeguards.72 The McKeiver Court did not 
want to provide juveniles with juries because it worried that ju-
ries would prejudge the juveniles.73 The Court believed that ju-
ries, unlike judges with special expertise, would not take social 
and psychological factors into account.74 The use of juries, the 
Court thought, would ruin the juvenile court’s rehabilitative 
mission.75 
The majority in McKeiver applied the fundamental fairness 
due process standard.76 The Court inquired whether the right 
to trial by jury is a “necessary component of accurate 
 
 67. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21 (1967); see also Sandberg, supra note 52, at 
61. 
 68. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
 69. Id. at 363.  
 70. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).  
 71. Jay D. Blitzman, Gault’s Promise, 9 BARRY L. REV. 67, 76 (2007) (“[A] 
mere four years later McKeiver held that juveniles were not entitled to the 
panoply of due process rights that adults have in criminal proceedings.”); Per-
ry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal 
Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 296 (2008) (“[The 
Court] has expressly refused to grant juveniles all of the procedural rights af-
forded adults.”). 
 72. 403 U.S. 528, 545–50 (1971). 
 73. But see id. at 568–69 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that juries 
would provide juveniles a chance not to be judged on their backgrounds). 
 74. But see id. 
 75. See id.  
 76. Id. at 543 (plurality opinion). 
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factfinding.”77 The majority held that jury trials are not the on-
ly way to engage in a fact-finding mission.78 Finally, it worried 
that requiring jury trials would disrupt the states’ ability to ex-
periment with methods to help young offenders.79  
In summary, the Supreme Court provided juveniles with 
some due process safeguards but, as time went on, became re-
luctant to provide any more.80 Juvenile courts became “quasi-
criminal” in nature because they offered some rights and safe-
guards, but not others.81 These courts struggled with their orig-
inal rehabilitative foundation and the State’s purported inter-
est of controlling crime.82 
B. THE MOVE TOWARDS A PUNITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, juvenile crime spiked.83 
In response, state legislatures passed “get tough on crime” 
laws.84 Public outcry against rising juvenile crime led forty-
seven states and the District of Columbia to enact laws aimed 
at juveniles who commit serious and violent crimes.85 The puni-
tive nature of the juvenile justice system is evidenced by sub-
stantive changes in five areas of the law: (1) facilitating the 
transfer of juveniles to the adult criminal justice system; (2) 
expanding sentencing options to include punitive measures; (3) 
 
 77. Id.; see also Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 65, at 562 (“[A] critical 
premise of the Court’s analysis in McKeiver was that judges can be as fair as 
juries in deciding cases.”). 
 78. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.  
 79. Moriearty, supra note 71. 
 80. See, e.g., McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (denying that a jury trial in juve-
nile courts is a constitutional requirement). 
 81. Moriearty, supra note 71, at 287. 
 82. See LARRY J. SIEGEL & BRANDON C. WELSH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: 
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 446 (10th ed. 2009). 
 83. Connie M. Tang et al., Effects of Trial Venue and Pretrial Bias on the 
Evaluation of Juvenile Defendants, 34 CRIM. JUST. REV. 210, 210 (2009). 
 84. Id.; Christine D. Ely, Note, A Criminal Education: Arguing for Ade-
quacy in Adult Correctional Facilities, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 795, 798 
(2008). 
 85. Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Poli-
cy, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 407 (2006); Tang et al., supra note 83. For ex-
ample, in Michigan, the legislature lowered the age at which a juvenile could 
be waived into adult court from fifteen to fourteen. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., 
Sentencing a Child for Murder in a “Get Tough” Era, CRIM. JUST., Spring 
2000, at 70, 71. In Minnesota, the legislature attempted to lower the age from 
fourteen to thirteen. Bob Collins, Should More Juveniles Be Charged as 
Adults?, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 13, 2008, 11:55 AM), http://minnesota 
.publicradio.org/collections/special/columns/news_cut/archive/2008/03/should_
more_juveniles_be_charg.shtml. 
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reducing or removing confidentiality; (4) focusing on victims’ 
rights; and (5) correctional programming.86 
From 1992 to 1995, forty states adopted laws making it 
easier for juvenile delinquents to be charged, tried, and con-
victed in adult criminal court.87 Many state legislatures 
amended their juvenile codes’ purpose clause to include puni-
tive language, marking a departure from their previously reha-
bilitative focus.88 Many states enacted statutes for mandatory-
minimum and determinate sentencing and reduced the confi-
dentiality with court records juveniles enjoyed under the old 
statutes.89 Thirty-one state legislatures increased options for 
sentencing juveniles, and all but three states eliminated confi-
dentiality protections, enabling public access to juvenile pro-
ceedings and records.90 Research indicates that from 1988 to 
1992, discretionary judicial transfers of juvenile to adult court 
increased by sixty-eight percent.91 
In addition to state legislatures passing “get tough” legisla-
tion, Congress passed similar laws to transform the juvenile 
court into a punitive institution, departing from its rehabilita-
tive roots.92 In the 1990s, Congress amended the Juvenile Jus-
tice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 to create a more 
punitive system.93 The reluctance of the courts to implement 
more due process safeguards combined with increasingly puni-
tive legislation marked a departure from the juvenile court’s 
original rehabilitative mission.  
 
 86. RICHARD LAWRENCE & MARIO HESSE, JUVENILE JUSTICE 21–22 
(2010). 
 87. Beale, supra note 85; see also Ely, supra note 84, at 798–99 (detailing 
the types of laws adopted in that timeframe). 
 88. Moriearty, supra note 71, at 297. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Courtney P. Fain, Note, What’s in a Name? The Worrisome Inter-
change of Juvenile “Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions,” 49 B.C. L. 
REV. 495, 504 (2008). 
 91. Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal 
Reform Proposals Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 
715. 
 92. See Kelly M. Angell, Note, The Regressive Movement: When Juvenile 
Offenders are Treated as Adults, Nobody Wins, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 125, 
130 (2004). 
 93. Id. 
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In Ohio, a recent class action lawsuit prompted a thorough 
investigation of its juvenile detention facilities.94 The majority 
of the Ohio Department of Youth Services facilities were “over-
crowded, understaffed, and underserved in such vital areas as 
safety, education, mental health treatment and rehabilitative 
programming.”95 The independent investigators discovered 
that:  
Excessive force and the excessive use of isolation, some of it extraor-
dinarily prolonged, is endemic to the ODYS system. 
  Juvenile Correctional Officers (JCOs) bitterly complained about 
the excessive use of mandated overtime, a practice at least partly 
driven by understaffing . . . . JCOs function now more like prison 
guards (or police officers) than trained partners in a shared rehabili-
tative effort.96 
A mere twenty-one percent of juveniles in detention facili-
ties are charged with serious, violent crimes.97 One chief proba-
tion officer succinctly explained, “These are kids we are angry 
at, not kids we are scared of.”98 Whereas the juvenile court sys-
tem used to focus on the social welfare of the children, it has 
now become a “second-class criminal court for young people.”99 
C. THE ABILITY OF A JUVENILE TO CONTEST PRETRIAL 
DETENTION 
In light of the punitive legislation passed, juveniles lack 
sufficient due process safeguards to contest pretrial detention. 
Preventative detention was historically used as a tool in adult 
criminal court to detain defendants, but its use has been ex-
tended to juvenile court.100 Courts traditionally detained juve-
niles prior to trial only to ensure that the youth attended all fu-
ture court dates.101 This Note considers the precedent, 
purposes, and interests implicated in order to understand the 
 
 94. FRED COHEN, FINAL FACT-FINDING REPORT: S.H. V. STICKRATH, i 
(2008), available at http://www.dys.ohio.gov/DNN/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket= 
lDovnn7P96A%3D&tabid=81&mid=394. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at ii. 
 97. THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., TWO DECADES OF JDAI: A PROGRESS 
REPORT FROM DEMONSTRATION PROJECT TO NATIONAL STANDARD 7 (2009). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Re-
sponsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 68 
(1997).  
 100. See Moriearty, supra note 71, at 299. 
 101. Id. at 303. 
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deprivation of due process involved when a juvenile is detained 
prior to adjudication. 
Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Schall v. 
Martin, the Second Circuit heard the case.102 The critical issue 
centered on juvenile pretrial detention rights.103 The New York 
Family Court Act allowed a juvenile offender to be detained if 
the judge found “that there is a ‘serious risk’ that the child ‘may 
before the return date commit an act which if committed by an 
adult would constitute a crime.’”104 Although the Supreme 
Court later reversed the decision, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the provision was “unconstitutional as to all 
juveniles” because the statute is administered in such a way 
that “the detention period serves as punishment imposed with-
out proof of guilt established according to the requisite consti-
tutional standard.”105 The statute allowed juvenile courts to 
place presumptively innocent offenders in detention.106 It ena-
bled judges to detain juveniles without holding a probable 
cause hearing at their initial appearance.107  
Regardless of the Second Circuit’s ruling, the Schall Court 
authorized preventative detention based on the future danger-
ousness of the offender.108 The Court applied the fundamental-
fairness due process standard and found that preventative de-
tention statute in question did not violate due process because 
it served a legitimate regulatory purpose.109 The Schall opinion 
contended that pretrial detention of juveniles serves a legiti-
mate governmental interest of protecting society and the of-
fender from the “potential consequences of his criminal acts.”110 
 
 102. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 254 (1984). 
 103. See id. at 255–57. 
 104. Id. at 255 (quoting N.Y. JUD. LAW § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983)). 
 105. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 373, 374 (2d Cir. 1982), rev’d sub 
nom. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
 106. Id. at 372–74. 
 107. See id. at 369–70; Corey Steinberg, Note, “Justice Delayed is Justice 
Denied”: The Abuse of Pre-Arraignment Delay, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 403, 
415 (1992) (summarizing the holding in Strasburg). 
 108. Schall, 467 U.S. at 278 (“[F]rom a legal point of view there is nothing 
inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.”); see 
Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How “Future Dangerousness” 
Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rational 
for the Executions it Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 165 (2008). 
 109. Schall, 467 U.S. at 268, 274. 
 110. Id. at 264 (citation omitted). 
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Additionally, preventative detention helped the government 
avoid the “serious risk”111 to public safety the juvenile poses.112  
The Court based its holding in part on parens patriae.113 
Juveniles, presumably, are constantly under adult supervision 
and control.114 The Court equated state custody with being in 
the custody of a parent.115 Thus, the Court reasoned that when 
juveniles commit crimes, it means that their parents failed to 
properly supervise them.116 The State is simply temporarily 
taking over the parenting role.117 In the eyes of the Court, the 
State must step in and detain the juvenile to “preserv[e] and 
promot[e] the welfare of the child.”118 
Ultimately, the Court held that the governmental interest 
in detaining juveniles outweighs the deprivation of a juvenile’s 
liberty interest.119 Since Schall, states have broadened their 
statutes to enable courts to detain juveniles on the basis of a 
multitude of other factors.120 Notably, during the ten years fol-
lowing the Schall decision, detention of juveniles has risen by 
seventy-two percent.121  
This Note addresses the implication that a juvenile’s liber-
ty interest amounts to something less than a fundamental 
right. As the juvenile justice system becomes increasingly puni-
tive, courts’ analyses of due process challenges have largely 
remained the same. Given the sharply punitive nature of the 
system, the Supreme Court should revisit past decisions and 
reconsider its current legal standard. Part II analyzes the flaws 
 
 111. Id. at 278.  
 112. Bernard P. Perlmutter, “Unchain the Children”: Gault, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, and Shackling, 9 BARRY L. REV. 1, 42 (2007).  
 113. Schall, 467 U.S. at 265 (“But that interest must be qualified by the 
recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.”). 
 114. See id. (“They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, 
and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens 
patriae.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 266 (asserting that the State should take a parental role to pro-
tect the juvenile from any further consequences of his “criminal activity”).  
 118. Id. at 265 (citation omitted); Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preven-
tive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 
85, 131 (2011) (noting that the Schall Court held that juveniles have only a 
“‘qualified’ liberty interest [because] unlike adults, [they are] ‘always in some 
form of custody’” (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 265)). 
 119. See Moriearty, supra note 71. 
 120. Id. at 303 (including factors such as future dangerousness and ade-
quate supervision and care). 
 121. Id. 
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in precedent and statutes pertaining to the pretrial detention of 
juveniles. It demonstrates that juveniles facing pretrial deten-
tion lack adequate due process safeguards.  
II.  AN EXAMINATION OF STATUTES AND PRECEDENT: 
THE LACK OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM   
This Part examines Schall v. Martin and its deleterious 
impact on the juvenile justice system. First, this Part assesses 
the gravity of a juvenile’s liberty interest to be free from physi-
cal restraint. Second, this Part examines the stigmatization of 
juveniles who are detained prior to trial. Finally, this Part cri-
tiques the current statutory framework pertaining to the pre-
ventative detention of juveniles. It argues that the criteria 
listed in the current statutes lead to arbitrary and capricious 
judicial decision making and due process violations.  
A. REVISITING SCHALL V. MARTIN  
The Supreme Court decided Schall in 1984122—before the 
“get tough on crime” era and the spike in juvenile crime in the 
1990s.123 This Section reexamines the Schall decision in light of 
the changes that resulted from new legislation. In addition, it 
urges the reconsideration of the use of parens patriae given the 
legislature’s departure from the rehabilitative model for the ju-
venile court system. The legal and political climates have sub-
stantially changed following the spike in juvenile crime in the 
1990s.124 In order to ensure the system offers juveniles ade-
quate due process protection, the reasoning behind Schall must 
be reexamined. 
1. Reconsidering the Magnitude of a Juvenile’s Liberty 
Interest  
In order to determine whether a fundamental right is at is-
sue in a Due Process challenge, a court must first identify the 
right in question.125 The Supreme Court has explained that 
“[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, 
and the liberty it protects includes more than the absence of 
 
 122. Schall, 467 U.S. at 253. 
 123. Tang et al., supra note 83. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). 
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physical restraint.”126 One methodology protects those rights 
which are “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition . . . .’”127 Fundamental rights are those which are 
“‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”128 The 
Court has consistently held that Due Process includes the right 
to be free from physical restraint.129 When a fundamental right 
is implicated, the Court applies strict scrutiny.130 Under strict 
scrutiny, the government must have a compelling interest and 
its means of regulation must be narrowly tailored to that  
interest.131  
The Schall Court recognized that juveniles have a “sub-
stantial”—rather than “fundamental”—interest to be free from 
physical restraint.132 The Court downplayed the interest by re-
lying on the idea that children are always in some form of cus-
tody.133 Children have a diminished liberty interest because the 
doctrine of parens patriae supports the idea that the State 
should take a parental role if necessary.134 The post-Schall ju-
venile justice system’s emphasis on the individualized treat-
ment for each juvenile enables judges to exercise a great degree 
of control over juvenile offenders’ lives.135  
Following the “get tough on crime” legislation in the 1990s, 
the juvenile justice system has lost sight of the principle of 
 
 126. Id. at 719 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127. Id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 
(1977)). 
 128. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325, 326 (1937)); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (relying on similar language).  
 129. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 
18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673–74 (1977)). 
 130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental 
rights’ are involved . . . regulation limiting these rights may be justified only 
by a ‘compelling state interest,’ . . . and legislative enactments must be nar-
rowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 264; see also Michael H. Langley, The Juvenile Court: The Mak-
ing of a Delinquent, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 273, 274 (1972) (pointing out that ju-
venile courts “establish value priorities” to help guide each juvenile through 
the system). 
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parens patriae.136 Yet continued reliance on the principle of 
parens patriae gives a great deal of discretion to judges over a 
multitude of decisions, including the decision to detain a juve-
nile pending trial.137 The original justification for giving judges 
discretion over juvenile detention was to facilitate the rehabili-
tative process for juvenile offenders.138 Judges, however, have 
been using pretrial detention as a teaching tool without regard 
to the detrimental consequences youth face.139 Since the system 
has become more punitive, the justification for judicial discre-
tion is no longer applicable. Regardless of the severity of the of-
fense, the strength of the evidence, or the sentence the juvenile 
faces after the trial, the judge remains free to detain the  
offender.140  
In addition, courts should abandon the parens patriae 
principle because the detainment of a juvenile in a state insti-
tution is not comparable to the control a parent exerts over a 
child.141 Parental custody is markedly different from state in-
carceration.142 The majority opinion in In re Gault emphasizes 
the distinct differences between state incarceration and paren-
tal custody: 
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a receiv-
ing home or an industrial school for juveniles is an institution of con-
finement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser 
time. His world becomes a building with whitewashed walls, regi-
mented routine and institutional hours . . . . Instead of mother and fa-
ther and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is 
peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and delinquents con-
fined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.143 
The differences between parental and state custody highlighted 
in the In re Gault opinion should not be ignored. 
 
 136. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the 
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 
1120 (1991) (“[T]he paternalistic tendencies that juvenile court engenders in 
its functionaries undermines the norm of litigant process control . . . . All of 
these divergences from procedural justice norms strongly suggest that, in the 
eyes of juvenile respondents, the legitimacy of juvenile court is suspect.”); 
Tang et al., supra note 83.  
 137. TANENHAUS, supra note 21, at 58, 104. 
 138. Charles E. Frazier & Donna M. Bishop, The Pretrial Detention of Ju-
veniles and Its Impact on Case Dispositions, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1133 (1985). 
 139. DAHLBERG, supra note 1, at 8. 
 140. Frazier & Bishop, supra note 138, at 1135.  
 141. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. (citations omitted). 
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The secure juvenile detention facilities at issue in Schall 
“subjected [juveniles] to strip-searches,” forced them to wear 
“institutional clothing,” and demanded that they abide by an 
“institutional regimen.”144 Juveniles could also be placed in 
nonsecure facilities, which were comparable to halfway houses 
for adults.145 At the time the Court decided Schall, courts 
placed roughly six times as many juveniles in secure-detention 
facilities as into nonsecure facilities.146 The nature of the juve-
nile detention centers support the proposition that state custo-
dy is distinct from parental custody.  
Juveniles should enjoy a fundamental right to be free from 
physical restraint, not merely a “substantial interest.” 
2. Pretrial Detention is a Punitive Measure that Stigmatizes 
Presumptively Innocent Juveniles  
Pretrial detention has a profound impact upon children. 
The use of pretrial detention as a punishment tool ostracizes 
presumptively innocent children. Separating children from 
their communities and removing them from their schools has 
harsh and deleterious effects.  
The use of pretrial detention as punishment violates the 
principle of fairness enshrined in the Due Process Clause. 
Schall explained that to avoid violation of the Due Process 
Clause “a pretrial detainee [can]not be punished.”147 However, 
the majority regarded the pretrial detention of juveniles as a 
legitimate regulatory measure that, absent an express intent to 
punish, did not rise to the level of unconstitutionality.148 The 
Schall Court did not consider that the removal of a juvenile 
from his or her family results in the isolation of children from 
their communities and families. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall quoted the experienced family 
court judge in the case to describe the true nature of juvenile 
pretrial detention:  
Then again, Juvenile Center, as much as we might try, is not the 
most pleasant place in the world. If you put them in detention, you 
are liable to be exposing these youngsters to all sorts of things. They 
are liable to be exposed to assault, they are liable to be exposed to 
sexual assaults. You are taking the risk of putting them together with 
 
 144. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 287–88 (1984) (quoting United States 
ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 695 n.5 (1981)). 
 145. Id. at 271.  
 146. Id. at 287 n.10. 
 147. Id. at 269 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979)). 
 148. Id.  
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a youngster that might be much worse than they, possibly might be, 
and it might have a bad effect in that respect.149 
The overuse of pretrial detention of juveniles presents seri-
ous legal, sociological, and economic consequences.150 Pretrial 
detention should not be viewed as a therapeutic measure.151 A 
recent report found that in Massachusetts, at least one in 
twelve detained youth experience a serious incident, which in-
cludes peer-on-peer conflict, threatening or disruptive conduct, 
or suicidal tendencies.152 The average stay of each juvenile is a 
lengthy sixteen days in Massachusetts.153 In addition to the 
impact detention has on juveniles, the taxpayer bears the brunt 
of the economic consequence of pretrial detention. Detaining 
just one juvenile costs Massachusetts taxpayers a hefty 
$15,000.154  
The separation of a juvenile from his or her family prior to 
trial has detrimental effects on the youth.155 The complete sep-
aration of a juvenile from his or her community, home, school, 
and life is a substantial burden.156 One author explains that, 
“[e]ven juveniles who remain housed with other juveniles can 
suffer permanent and debilitating harm just by virtue of being 
incarcerated.”157 Separating juveniles from their families repre-
sents another reason why the pretrial detention of juveniles is 
a punitive decision.158  
Stigmatizing juveniles is contrary to the concept of parens 
patriae. The objective of parens patriae can be viewed as two-
fold.159 First, the principle helps to legitimize the State’s inter-
 
 149. Id. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 150. See id. at 291 (“Such serious injuries to presumptively innocent per-
sons—encompassing the curtailment of their constitutional rights to liberty—
can be justified only by a weighty public interest that is substantially ad-
vanced by the statute.”); Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile 
Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They 
Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1337 (1989) (“The overuse and 
abuse of pretrial detention is a recurrent theme in juvenile justice.”).  
 151. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majori-
ty’s . . . characterization of preventative detention . . . is difficult to take  
seriously.”). 
 152. DAHLBERG, supra note 1, at 7. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Angell, supra note 92, at 142. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  
 158. See id. at 142–43 (discussing the stigmatization of detention).  
 159. Langley, supra note 135, at 281. 
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vention into the youth’s life.160 Second, the protective, caring 
role of the judge attempts to minimize the criminal stigmatiza-
tion of juvenile offenders.161 Nonetheless, in today’s punitive 
system, incarceration, even if only for a week, has the effect of 
labeling the juvenile as an offender.162 It stigmatizes the juve-
nile and alienates him or her from the community.163 Attaching 
stigma to an alleged juvenile offender does not serve the sys-
tem’s rehabilitative purpose or the purported objective of 
parens patriae.164   
In addition to the sociological effects, the pretrial detention 
of juveniles has serious legal consequences. Numerous empiri-
cal studies have shown that the pretrial-detainment decision 
substantially influences the juvenile court judge’s ruling later in 
the case.165 In fact, the pretrial detention decision constitutes the 
“second most important determinate” in subsequent sentencing 
decisions to remove juveniles from their homes.166 The impris-
onment of young offenders leads to higher rates of recidivism.167  
Juveniles cannot easily get rid of the stigma that even 
temporary incarceration brings.168 Taking punitive measures to 
deal with juvenile crime may have the effect of turning youth 
into hardened criminals.169 The stigma may cause the juveniles 
to believe they are delinquents and to start acting that way.170 
Simply put, the incarceration of juveniles prior to adjudication 
has serious, lasting effects, and the deleterious effects of deten-
 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 503, 527 (1984) (“Concluding that contact with the juvenile court is a key 
event in the creation of further deviant behavior, labeling theorists urged a 
broad prohibition against unwarranted and potentially counterproductive ju-
venile court intervention into the lives of children experiencing deviant  
episodes.”). 
 163. Langley, supra note 135, at 278. 
 164. See id. at 281 ( listing the objectives of parens patriae). 
 165. Feld, supra note 150, at 1337–38. 
 166. Id. at 1338. 
 167. Ethel Reyes Hernandez, In Re L.M.: Following Kansas Down the Path 
to Juvenile Justice, 35 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 257, 271–72 (2010); see also An-
gell, supra note 92, at 142 (“In addition, when ‘ties to the conventional com-
munity are broken[, i]nmate groups provide subcultural support for crime,’ 
which further encourages recidivism.” (quoting Donna M. Bishop et al., Juve-
nile Justice Under Attack: An Analysis of the Causes and Impact of Recent Re-
forms, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 152 (1998))). 
 168. Angell, supra note 92, at 142. 
 169. Hernandez, supra note 167; Angell, supra note 92, at 126–27. 
 170. Angell, supra note 92, at 142. 
 2012] JUVENILES LOCKED IN LIMBO 2169 
 
tion call for greater due process safeguards. 
3. The Denigration of Parens Patriae in State Legislation  
The Schall Court based its decision largely on the principle 
of parens patriae.171 A 2003 survey revealed that a mere nine 
states continue to use language from the Standard Juvenile 
Court Act, which is based on the principle of parens patriae.172 
The purpose of the Standard Juvenile Court Act was that:  
[E]ach child coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall re-
ceive . . . the care, guidance, and control that will conduce to his wel-
fare . . . and . . . when he is removed from the control of his parents 
the court shall secure for him care as nearly as possible equivalent to 
that which they should have given him.173 
Only three states and the District of Columbia use lan-
guage in statutes to explain the sole or primary purpose of the 
juvenile justice system is to promote the best interests and wel-
fare of the juveniles.174 For instance, Massachusetts requires 
that accused juveniles be “treated, not as criminals, but as chil-
dren in need of aid, encouragement and guidance.”175 West Vir-
ginia declares that it intends to implement “all reasonable 
means and methods that can be established by a humane and 
enlightened state, solicitous of the welfare of its children, for 
the prevention of delinquency and for the care and rehabilita-
tion of juvenile delinquents . . . .”176 Conversely, a number of 
states now cite “punishment and/or offender accountability” as 
a goal.177 The policy differences highlight the fact that juvenile 
justice system has effectively moved away from the original re-
habilitative foundation.178 In light of the denigration of parens 
patriae, Schall must be reconsidered. 
4. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Does Not Prevent the 
Reversal of Schall 
The Supreme Court noted in Lawrence v. Texas that “[t]he 
doctrine of stare decisis . . . is not . . . an inexorable com-
mand.”179 The Lawrence Court cautioned overruling decisions 
 
 171. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). 
 172. Angell, supra note 92, at 131.  
 173. Id. at 131 n.48. 
 174. Id. at 131. 
 175. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 53 (LexisNexis 2009).  
 176. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5B-2 (LexisNexis 2009).  
 177. Angell, supra note 92, at 131.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). 
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which recognized a constitutional liberty interest that resulted 
in “individual or societal reliance” on such a liberty.180 Schall 
did not induce the sort of detrimental individual or societal re-
liance that could justify upholding the decision.181 On the con-
trary, reversal would alleviate the hardship on juveniles who 
are facing the detrimental consequences of pretrial detention. 
Since Schall, the juvenile justice system has become increasingly 
punitive, straying from its rehabilitative mission.182 Overruling 
the decision would offer much-needed protection to juveniles. 
The Lawrence Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick due to 
Bowers’s erroneous holding that the Due Process Clause did not 
encompass the liberty interest to engage in consensual, inti-
mate relations.183 The same reasoning should apply in Schall. 
The Schall Court failed to recognize that juveniles have a fun-
damental constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.184 The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment endeavors to protect, not oppress, in-
dividuals.185 As such, the doctrine of stare decisis cannot justify 
the deprivation of constitutional rights, and it should not pre-
vent the Court from overruling Schall to protect minors in the 
juvenile justice system. 
B. BROAD STATUTES LEAD TO THE OVERUSE OF PRETRIAL 
DETENTION AND DEGRADE DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
As mentioned previously, the shift of the juvenile justice 
 
 180. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855–
56 (1992)).  
 181. See, e.g., id. at 577–78 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), in part because it did not induce detrimental reliance); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (upholding Roe v. Wade be-
cause that decision induced “reliance that would lend a special hardship to the 
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation”). 
 182. For a discussion of the increasingly punitive juvenile justice system, 
see supra Part I.B. 
 183. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (overruling Bowers in part because it 
“was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today”). 
 184. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (defining the right as 
substantial rather than fundamental). 
 185. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79 (“Had those who drew and ratified 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amend-
ment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might 
have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew 
times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws 
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Consti-
tution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their 
own search for greater freedom.”). 
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system from rehabilitation to punitive punishment is reflected 
in the passage of the “get tough on crime” legislation in the 
1990s.186 The seventy-two percent increase in the pretrial de-
tention of juveniles from 1985 to 1995187 lends credence to the 
idea that the juvenile justice system has become more punitive 
in nature.188 The change in the political climate is mirrored by 
the change in the legal system.189  
Vague statutes grant the judiciary a wealth of discretion 
over the fate of juveniles facing pretrial detention.190 For exam-
ple, the relevant Ohio statute provides a number of ways for 
the court to legally detain a juvenile, including “an order for 
placement of the child in detention or shelter care . . . made by 
the court.”191 The statute itself does not specify the criteria on 
which a judge should base that determination.192 The Ohio 
statute enables courts to detain juveniles prior to trial for rea-
sons that have nothing to do with unlawful conduct. The follow-
ing language in the statute substantiates this assertion:  
A child taken into custody shall not be confined . . . unless detention 
or shelter care is required to protect the child from immediate or 
threatened physical or emotional harm . . . because the child has no 
parents, guardian, or custodian or other person able to provide super-
vision and care for the child and return the child to the court when 
required . . . .193 
 
 186. Ely, supra note 84. 
 187. Moriearty, supra note 71, at 303. 
 188. See Sean E. Smith, Sealing Up the Problem of California’s “One Strike 
and You’re Out” Approach for Serious Juvenile Offenders, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 339, 352–53 (2010) (asserting that many states moved away from the re-
habilitative model for juvenile courts). 
 189. See id. at 349 (explaining that politicians used “tough on crime” cam-
paigns to win elections while legal scholars focused on how the rehabilitative 
goals of the juvenile justice system had failed). 
 190. See Feld, supra note 150, at 1338 (“Detention constitutes a highly ar-
bitrary and capricious process of short-term confinement with no tenable or 
objective rationale. Once it occurs, however, it then increases the likelihood of 
additional post-adjudication sanctions as well. In operation, detention almost 
randomly imposes punishment on some juveniles for no obvious reason and 
then punishes them again for having been punished before.”); Kim, supra note 
23, at 857 (“The denial of these and other rights is especially troubling because 
the legal criteria for certain status offenses are very vague. The lack of clarity in 
these statutes allows for a great deal of discretion for juvenile court judges.”). 
 191. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.31(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2011); see also 
Claudia Worrell, Note, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protec-
tion Masked by the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 174, 176 n.13 (1985) 
( listing various child-detention statutes). 
 192. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.31. 
 193. Id. § 2151.31(C)(1); see also Worrell, supra note 191. 
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Not surprisingly, in 2006, forty-five percent of the 5438 ju-
venile offenders in detainment in Massachusetts had been 
charged with misdemeanors.194 Following pretrial detainment, 
at least eighty percent of the alleged offenders returned home 
after the disposition of their cases.195 No public documents 
substantiated a claim that the detained children had failed to 
appear for court dates or that they posed a danger to the  
community.196  
The reliance on the idea that a juvenile may be dangerous 
in the future leads to the overuse of pretrial detention.197 Alt-
hough the Supreme Court acknowledges the presumption of in-
nocence,198 it validates the use of the imprecise factor of the 
probability that the alleged offender will recidivate.199 With no 
way to accurately quantify a presumptively innocent juvenile’s 
tendency to commit future crimes, courts make arbitrary de-
terminations.200  
The statute in question in Schall allowed judges to place 
juveniles in pretrial detention prior to holding a fact-finding 
hearing to determine whether the juvenile posed a risk to socie-
ty.201 In fact, the statute allowed juveniles to remain in deten-
tion for five days before holding the probable cause hearing.202 
This five-day waiting period constituted a punitive measure 
which stigmatizes the alleged offender and amounts to a lack of 
fundamental fairness.203 
Broad statutes facilitate the overuse of pretrial detention 
and denigrate the few due process protections juveniles retain 
during the pretrial detention phase. Statutes should employ 
the use of specific criteria to avoid giving the judiciary exces-
sive discretion.  
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C. THE IMPORTANCE OF DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS 
OUTWEIGHS EFFICIENCY CONCERNS  
Opponents of granting juveniles more due process safe-
guards cite efficiency concerns. Specifically, they argue that 
additional due process safeguards would result in a backlog of 
hearings and impede the functionality of the juvenile court.204 
On the contrary, experience demonstrates that allowing juve-
niles the right to a jury has not seriously halted the juvenile 
justice system.205 Similarly, providing juveniles with an addi-
tional hearing which allows them a meaningful opportunity to 
contest pretrial detention will not impede the functioning of the 
system.206  
In fact, providing juveniles with additional safeguards, 
such as jury trials, aids the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile 
court.207 Offering a disgruntled minor a chance to have his or 
her case heard before an objective jury may help rebuke the no-
tion that the system treated the individual unfairly.208 A jury 
trial can help instill a sense of responsibility and self-esteem in 
a juvenile.209 Correspondingly, a hearing prior to pretrial de-
tention and other procedural safeguards may help the juvenile 
believe the system operates fairly and with a sense of justice.  
Efficiency concerns must not supersede the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Juveniles deserve fair 
judicial hearings on the matter of pretrial detention. Without 
an adequate and meaningful opportunity to dispute pretrial de-
tention, juveniles will be separated from their communities and 
face undue stigmatization. Their constitutional right to be free 
from bodily restraint210 should not be diminished. 
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III.  TOWARD THE RECOGNITION OF A NEW 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: ENSURING FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS FOR JUVENILES   
The judiciary has the power to end the lack of procedural 
safeguards available to juveniles at the pretrial detention 
stage. The United States Supreme Court must recognize, as the 
Kansas Supreme Court boldly did, that the nature of the juve-
nile justice system has changed drastically.211 New legislation 
and court decisions have moved the system away from its once 
rehabilitative foundation.212 The fundamental alteration of the 
system demands that courts take a second look at the due pro-
cess safeguards provided for juveniles.213 In a system that fa-
vors punitive measures to punish the so-called juvenile super-
predators,214 the Court must step in to ensure the fundamental 
fairness of the system. The Court should grant the same proce-
dural safeguards that adults enjoy to juvenile offenders. 
The recognition that physically detaining juveniles impli-
cates a fundamental right will lead to the creation of national 
guidelines and criteria for detainment. Stricter guidelines will 
reduce the number of juveniles in pretrial detention. This will 
alleviate the burden on state resources and foster the develop-
ment of diversionary programs. Utilizing diversionary pro-
grams, rather than pretrial detention, will help the juvenile 
justice system return to its rehabilitative underpinnings. 
A. THE COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
DESERVE A PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING AND THE RIGHT TO 
REASONABLE BAIL 
The first step toward fixing the lack of fundamental fair-
ness in the juvenile justice system is recognizing that juveniles, 
like adults, have a fundamental right to be free from physical 
restraint, not just a substantial interest.215 Justice Thurgood 
Marshall proclaimed, “If the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Pro-
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cess Clause means anything, it means freedom from physical 
restraint.”216 The essence of the Due Process Clause is ensuring 
people the right to be free from physical restraint. Therefore, 
the Court should recognize that a juvenile’s liberty interest 
amounts to a fundamental right, not just a substantial interest. 
The distinction between a fundamental right and a sub-
stantial interest is crucial. A fundamental right may only be 
burdened if the government holds a compelling interest.217 
Forcing the government to demonstrate that a very important 
interest exists coincides with precedent relating to pretrial de-
tention.218 For adult defendants, a state “must provide a fair 
and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for 
any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determina-
tion must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly 
after arrest.”219 The State must prove there is probable cause to 
believe the person committed the crime charged in order to hold 
him pending further proceedings.220 
Considering the severity of “prolonged detention,” the 
Court has forbidden pretrial incarceration for adults without a 
probable cause determination.221 Likewise, the Court recog-
nized that if the government wishes to set bail for adults “at a 
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to” ensure 
the defendant attends court dates, then a hearing must be held 
to ensure the amount does not violate the defendant’s Eighth 
Amendment rights.222  
Courts are already paving the way toward more procedural 
safeguards for pretrial detention of juveniles. For example, a 
court in Louisiana held that providing bail to juveniles prior to 
trial was necessary to comport with the fundamental fairness 
standard outlined in Gault.223 It based its decision on the prem-
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ise that the presumption of innocence may only be preserved if 
the court grants juveniles the right to bail.224 Most state courts, 
however, conclude that denial of the right to bail to juveniles is 
permissible because pretrial detention statutes provide an “ad-
equate substitute.”225 
In adult criminal court, many judicial decisions are based 
on predicative factors, such as potential for future dangerous-
ness.226 Yet, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment effectively constrains judicial decision making in 
adult cases.227 The Court recognizes that adults have a “strong 
liberty interest” in being free from physical restraint.228 A crim-
inal defendant’s “strong liberty interest” may only be subordi-
nated to the “greater needs of society” if “the government’s in-
terest is sufficiently weighty.”229 Compare this to the Court’s 
recognition that a juvenile has a “substantial” interest to be 
free from physical restraint which may be overcome simply by 
the government’s “legitimate interest.”230 
A comparison of the similarities in the sentencing guide-
lines for adults and juveniles sheds light on the situation.231 
For example, in Kansas, adults and juveniles face a myriad of 
similar consequences.232 Adults and juveniles may be sentenced 
to probation, community-based programs, house arrest, incar-
ceration in an institution, drug and alcohol assessments, and 
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counseling.233 Courts may also impose fines, restitution, and 
community service for juvenile and adult offenders.234 Juvenile 
offenders face many of same penalties adults do in the judicial 
system,235 yet juveniles lack most of the Due Process safe-
guards adults receive. 
Unlike adults, in most states, juvenile offenders do not 
have the right to bail.236 The Court has interpreted the Eighth 
Amendment to grant the right to reasonable bail for adults.237 
Many argue that juveniles do not need the constitutional right 
to reasonable bail because statutes authorize judges to release 
children to the custody of their parents.238 Nonetheless, this ar-
gument fails to address the reality that judges retain the dis-
cretion to refuse to release juveniles to their parents and in-
stead place juveniles in pretrial detention.239 Given the 
punitive nature of the juvenile system, courts should, at a min-
imum, grant children the same procedural safeguards that 
adults  
enjoy. 
B. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD IMPLEMENT A CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD IN JUVENILE PRETRIAL 
DETENTION HEARINGS 
Once the Court recognizes that juvenile offenders have a 
fundamental right to contest their pretrial detention, it should 
implement a heightened evidentiary standard. Logic demands, 
given the fundamental nature of the right at stake, that the 
Court institute a clear and convincing evidence standard in 
these proceedings.  
The Bail Reform Act ensures a number of procedural safe-
guards are available to adults:  
The judicial officer charged with the responsibility of determining the 
appropriateness of detention is guided by statutorily enumerated fac-
tors, which include the nature and the circumstances of the charges, 
the weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics of the puta-
tive offender, and the danger to the community. The Government 
must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, the ju-
dicial officer must include written findings of fact and a written state-
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ment of reasons for a decision to detain. The Act’s review provisions, 
provide for immediate appellate review of the detention decision.240 
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, prosecutors must es-
tablish “‘by clear and convincing evidence’ that the defendant 
will fail to return to court, obstruct justice, or intimidate a wit-
ness or juror, and that there are no conditions of release which 
would reasonably ensure the public’s safety.”241 The clear and 
convincing evidence burden of proof should rest on the prosecu-
tion when confining juveniles to pretrial detention as well.242 
The heightened burden of proof creates an “adversarial and 
formal” hearing process,243 which would protect a juvenile’s 
fundamental right to be free from physical restraint. 
C. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
WILL FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL 
STANDARD 
Historically, the judiciary has granted juveniles a number 
of Due Process safeguards, as explained in detail in Part I.A of 
this Note. Unlike state legislatures, the Supreme Court is insu-
lated from political pressure surrounding the spike in juvenile 
crime. The courts have always been responsible for protecting 
the rights of minorities because of their unique position in the 
political system. This insulation from political pressure makes 
the courts well-suited to start recognizing that juveniles have a 
fundamental right to be free from physical restraint.  
Once the Court recognizes that vague and overly broad 
pretrial detention statutes violate a juvenile’s constitutional 
right to be free from physical restraint, the legislature will be 
forced to amend those laws. Legislatures will have to provide 
clear criteria to guide judicial decision making. The revisions to 
these statutes should mirror those present in the adult pretrial 
detention statutes. Additionally, these criteria should reflect 
the detrimental sociological consequences juveniles face when 
detained.  
The Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) of-
fers states a model to reduce the number of juveniles detained, 
reduce the financial burden on taxpayers, promote public safe-
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ty, and reduce racial disparities.244 JDAI encourages the adop-
tion of plans that focus on alternatives to detaining youth.245 
Currently, jurisdictions in twenty-seven states utilize the JDAI 
model, encompassing seventeen percent of the nation’s juvenile 
population.246 While the number of states that use JDAI is 
growing, the Supreme Court’s recognition of a fundamental 
right would provide a uniform national standard and ensure all 
juveniles have procedural safeguards.  
The judiciary has the responsibility to recognize that juve-
niles have a fundamental, constitutional right to contest pretri-
al detention. Stricter criteria in statutes coupled with the 
recognition of a fundamental right will reduce the number of 
juveniles in detention facilities.  
D. STATES SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE USE OF DIVERSIONARY 
PROGRAMS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRETRIAL DETENTION  
In order to return to the rehabilitative roots of the juvenile 
justice system, states should utilize diversionary programs as 
an alternative to pretrial detention. First and foremost, judges 
should strongly consider returning juveniles to the care of a 
guardian. When that is not practicable, judges should place ju-
veniles in diversionary programs and connect them with com-
munity-based resources. As a last resort, judges can consider 
pretrial detention in an institutional facility.  
Diversionary programs frequently exist at the sentencing 
stage, but community-based resources should be utilized as 
soon as a juvenile is detained for the first time. A program in 
San Francisco called Detention Diversion Advocacy Program 
(DDAP) focuses its energy on connecting repeat offenders with 
services to reduce recidivism rates.247 This type of program is 
referred to as a “wraparound” approach.248 Wraparound pro-
grams develop a “complex, multifaceted intervention strategy” 
aimed at keeping youth out of institutions and at home.249 
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Wraparound programs offer juveniles a plethora of community-
based support networks and individualized services.250 
The screening process for wraparound programs should oc-
cur in place of juvenile pretrial detention. If a judge decides to 
place a juvenile in a diversionary program, then qualified case 
managers, in conjunction with the youth’s family, will create a 
case plan. Wraparound programs assess the mental health, 
physical health, academic, and social needs of youth.251 Since 
this screening would begin prior to the adjudication of guilt, 
these programs would not focus on the guilt or innocence of the 
juvenile. Instead, the programs would take into account the 
needs of the youth and work with them accordingly. 
Opponents of using these rehabilitative programs may ar-
gue that they are too costly. Conversely, there are simple ways 
to defray the costs associated with these programs. If courts re-
duced their reliance on pretrial detention, then the costs asso-
ciated with detaining a juvenile would decrease. Since wrapa-
round programs often address health issues, Medicaid is often 
used to cover the costs.252 Programs could also request a contri-
bution from the juvenile’s parents, provided they are not indi-
gent. Additionally, policymakers advocate for investing in re-
habilitative programs for juveniles to avoid paying to prosecute 
and incarcerate these individuals in their adult lives.253 
  CONCLUSION   
The shift away from the rehabilitative roots and focus on 
the doctrine of parens patriae fundamentally altered the nature 
of the juvenile justice system. The increasingly punitive juve-
nile justice system warrants a second look at due process safe-
guards afforded to juvenile delinquents. The Supreme Court 
should recognize that juveniles facing pretrial detention cur-
rently do not have a meaningful opportunity to contest it. The 
Court should recognize that pretrial detention is starkly differ-
ent from parental custody. Overly broad statutes grant judges 
vast discretion over the outcome. Juveniles should have a fun-
damental right, not just a substantial interest, to be free from 
physical restraint. At a minimum, juveniles should enjoy the 
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same Due Process protections present in the adult criminal sys-
tem. Court recognition of a juvenile’s fundamental right to be 
free from bodily restraint would resolve the lack of fairness in 
the punitive juvenile justice system. 
 
